



Finding The Middle Ground: The Practical And Theoretical Center Between Ethnic Ideal And Extreme Behaviors

By: **Anatoly Isaenko** and **Peter Petschauer**

Abstract

This paper seeks to identify and describe the practical and theoretical middle ground between extreme ethnic prejudice that fuel acts such as pogrom and murder and the ready acceptance of individuals of every ethnicity in all aspects of life. Almost everyone in the industrialized world is aware of, and uncomfortable with, extreme expressions of ethnic prejudice and hatred that range from rape, imprisonment, and ethnic dislocation to concentration camps, ethnic cleansing, and murder. Examples such as Russian Imperial *pogroms*, Japanese actions against their conquered peoples, the Nazi Holocaust, South African Apartheid, the Rwandan genocide, and the various Yugoslavian horrors are well known. Far less well known, or understood, are the Russian Imperial categorizations of its native peoples; American actions against American Indians and Japanese Americans; Soviet actions against German-Russian citizens, Balts, Chechens, Ingushetians, and many others during World War II; the more recent Chinese move against the Tibetans; and the Turkish exploitations of minority populations.

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Introduction

This paper seeks to identify and describe the practical and theoretical middle ground between extreme ethnic prejudice that fuels acts such as *pogrom* and murder and the ready acceptance of individuals of every ethnicity in all aspects of life. Almost everyone in the industrialized world is aware of, and uncomfortable with, extreme expressions of ethnic prejudice and hatred that range from rape, imprisonment, and ethnic dislocation to concentration camps, ethnic cleansing, and murder. Examples such as Russian Imperial *pogroms*, Japanese actions against their conquered peoples, the Nazi Holocaust,

South African Apartheid, the Rwandan genocide, and the various Yugoslavian horrors are well known.¹ Far less well known, or understood, are the Russian Imperial categorizations of its native peoples; American actions against American Indians and Japanese Americans; Soviet actions against German-Russian citizens, Balts, Chechens, Ingushetians, and many others during World War II; the more recent Chinese move against the Tibetans; and the Turkish exploitations of minority populations. Probably even fewer people in this same industrialized world are cognizant of an ideal ethnic situation in which people of different backgrounds accommodate each other easily; most people in this world are familiar with the middle ground. As one of Petschauer's students put it in an April 2001 class discussion: "Most people just talk about the ideal; they don't know or don't want to know what it really is."

In order to fix the middle ground between ethnic exploitation and an ideal in which people live together in harmony, we proceeded in two ways. First, we listened to people's stories in person and identified stories in news articles and relevant literature. We collected stories of people who experienced ethnic distinctions that ranged from mere slights to forms of horror, stories that represented the middle ground as well as ethnic extremes. In Part I of this paper we highlight stories in which people experienced and remembered ethnically uncomfortable situations—where they were not living in harmony with those around them—but which were not extreme cases such as when people are jailed or murdered for not being members of the dominant ethnic group. We hope that a careful reading of these stories (to which the reader may add his or her own) will show that the ethnic middle ground is experienced in many different contexts, including the body, housing, language, religion, state policy, and economic opportunity.

The attached chart (pp. 68-71) places the stories of the middle in the surrounding context of ethnic peace and ethnic violence. It shows the situation with the human body/space, language, religion, shared histories, state policy, and economic opportunity, and it highlights in each category how complete normalcy, the middle ground, and extreme ethnic expression manifest themselves.

Second, we researched practical aspects of the middle ground and how it can gradually slide into extremes of ethnic distinction, discrimination, and abuse. Rather than look into a widely known example, such as the destruction of Jews in Europe, we chose to focus on Russian Imperial policies that firmly establish the middle

ground of ethnic abuses and allow us also to elaborate briefly the steps leading to more extreme expressions later in Russian history.

The stories we collected originated in many different cultural contexts and in many parts of the world. One particular problem we have tried to avoid from the outset is to see racism (in the US, for example) and ethnic aversion (such as in the Independent States of the former Soviet Union) as separate and distinct expressions of ethnic prejudice. We acknowledge that in some situations, individuals see racism as systematic mistreatment of African Americans and Third World peoples. We argue, however, that the broader issue is ethnicity and that the situation in which people of color find themselves in the US is comparable to that of other non-dominant ethnic groups around the world. While one can argue that color plays a significant and defining role in the American setting, one must allow that similar language about color in other settings creates similar contexts. For example, having called a certain set of Eastern European Jews *schwarz* in the late 19th century did not mean that they were black; it meant that non-Jews and *white* Jews (Central European Jews) saw them as darker and different than themselves. When refugees in a Czech refugee camp in 1999 were called *black*, it may have meant that they were from Africa or that they were Roman; in either case they were perceived as identifiable and different. Similarly, when Ethiopians viewed lighter-skinned fellow citizens as being "better" than darker-skinned persons, they were making a clear statement about ethnic preferences. All these groups were and are perceived as different because of their supposed lighter or darker skin color, and

because of other differences from other, most likely more dominant, ethnic groups in a certain setting.² Naming people of color African Americans, rather than black, is an attempt to address this very issue in one setting.

As we begin the main part of this paper, we would like to differentiate hostility between ethnic groups from worldwide struggles against modernization or Westernization and associated outbursts against modern facilities and other symbols of globalization. A good example of this hostility is the attack in September 1998 on the Planet Hollywood restaurant in Cape Town, South Africa. As R. C. Longworth (1998) stated, "There is a cultural war going on in the world, between globalism and tribal societies, between tradition and information age, between ancient truths and the revolutionary ideas and technologies that are shattering societies shaped by those truths" (pp. 1C and 4C). While some of the hostility against the modern world is directed against America and Americans, it is not an ethnic issue, or it is such an issue only by implication. If anything, it is a supra-ethnic issue, that is, it pits indigenous peoples vs. Westerners. For the most part the hostility is directed as much against persons in the society who modernize as it is directed against outsiders who bring in "modernization." America becomes the focus of a goodly proportion of this hostility because American products and enterprises are "everywhere."

We begin with a selection of tales of relatively mild expressions of ethnic distinction, discrimination, slights, and insults in parts of the US, Eastern Europe and Russia, the Caucasus Mountains, Northern Italy, and South Africa. We then proceed to what one can consider moderate

Russian Imperial policies, with reflections on the associated slide into more extreme practices during the Soviet period.

Part I: Experiencing the middle path

In April 1998, first-year Duke University student Winston Chi said he walked across campus and was accosted by a group of white men in a Jeep. They asked him for directions to the railroad, an obvious reference to Chinese having come to the US to help build railroads in the West. The group also directed obscenities against Chi, prefacing them with "Chinese" and "Korean" (Freeman, 1998).

On May 27, 1998, "Chief Justice William Rehnquist rejected a request by minority lawyers to discuss ways to recruit more minorities to fill the powerful law clerk jobs at the Supreme Court" (Mauro, 1998, p. 1A). Rehnquist also wrote that "he hires clerks on the basis of 'superior professional achievement in law school, together with an appraisal of how well we would work together. I have never excluded consideration of anyone because of that person's race or nationality'" (p. 1A). By that time, and since 1972, Rehnquist had hired 79 clerks at the Supreme Court. Of these none was African-American or Asian; one was Hispanic.

In a conversation with a real estate agent in Boone, North Carolina not too many years ago, Petschauer asked the agent why he never put prices with his properties. He answered: "Some black might then be able to get the house at that price," and continued, "I always want them to have to pay extra for the privilege of living here."

A different expression of ethnic prejudice or discrimination, somewhat more specific, occurred during the summer of 1998

in Olomouc in the Czech Republic. Several gypsies (Romany), most likely a mother and her children, were walking across the Lower Market Square. As they walked along, people stepped aside just enough to allow them to pass unencumbered. This stepping aside was not a friendly "getting out of the way," it was rather a brisk stepping aside so as to avoid contact and to create a path. Because of the frequency of this behavior at such specific instances, but also because of stereotyping of gypsies in parts of Eastern Europe, we can assume that people were stepping aside to avoid contact with this family.

A Bosnian student at the Olomouc Summer Institute in the summer of 1998 reported on a trip he had taken to Sarajevo. During his visit, he had deliberately not gone to Serb areas of the city. Although he speaks all the dialects of the city well, he was afraid of entering Serb neighborhoods because he thought that he would be beaten up if it were discovered that he was not one of their own.

In South Africa, according to several personal accounts, white South Africans are retreating into heavily armed ghettos. In some cases, newly established black South Africans join these families. The usual reason given for this separation into ghettos is that the crime rate has risen so dramatically that families must protect themselves. But one could also argue that these families, especially the white families, are afraid of black attack, without regard to reasons for the attack.

One of American society's most fascinating and damaging under-currents deals with the image of African-American males. Because the white male is considered the "ideal" male in US society, the

black male, the dark opposite of the white male, has a difficult time asserting his maleness and is often undercut by the generally accepted male stereotype. Tom Feelings's *The Middle Passage; White Ships Black Cargo* (1995), does an excellent job of reversing these stereotypes by portraying the slave collectors and deliverers as dark and the slaves as white, thus getting at one of the very origins of this form of stereotyping.

A faculty colleague tells of her experiences in Togo as an exchange faculty member in terms that almost reach the level of traumatization. She was derided not only by her non-American white colleagues, but also by the native population. The Australian, Swiss, German, and South African members of her academic team did not appreciate her being American; the Africans called her *jovo*, and thus let her know their disdain for the white outsider. She felt further isolated because the clothing that fit dark African skin so well did not suit her white skin at all.

In North Ossetia, at the foot of the Caucasus Mountains, colleagues from North Ossetian State University (NOSU) in the mid-1990s lavishly hosted the Petschauer. Unbeknownst to them, only those ethnically Russian and Cossack colleagues who, like Isaenko, were completely familiar with Ossetian cooking and table manners were invited to these feasts. Members of these ethnic minorities who were not experienced in these matters were excluded and thus deprived access to upper-level administrators and foreigners.

In the same North Ossetian setting, faculty members of NOSU who wanted to be successful made sure that they visibly displayed symbols of their allegiance to Ossetia. These symbols might include an

Ossetian flag prominently hung in the office, an obviously worn Ossetian shirt or hat, or an Ossetian button with the colors yellow, red, and white.

A young woman from Lithuania told Petschauer's class at the Olomouc Summer Institute in July 1998 about being partially Polish, Russian, Lithuanian, and Jewish and about the difficulties that this diversity created for her family. The issue that troubled them was: Should they send her younger brother to Lithuanian or Russian-speaking school? Although they speak Russian at home, sending him to Russian school would most likely mean that he would never speak Lithuanian well enough to succeed in Lithuania.

An aid worker helping in the aftermath of the terrible 1997 flood in the eastern Czech Republic discovered that gypsies were generally not being given as much water and food as their Czech neighbors. As a matter of fact, when an official was asked why the authorities did not give water to gypsies, he reportedly said that they could drink water from the river. This was a river swollen with particles and pollutants after the flood.

In the South Tyrol of Northern Italy, a former Austrian territory, negotiators for the German and Italian speaking ethnic groups agreed several years ago that young people could decide at age fifteen whether they wanted to be associated ethnically with the Italian or the German speaking group. This major choice brings with it several significant advantages and disadvantages. For example, if a young person chooses the Italian speaking option, s/he can attend higher education in Italy for the standard minimum tuition. If s/he chooses the German speaking option, s/he too can study in Italy, but has the ad-

ditional option of being able to attend higher educational institutions in Austria almost free of charge.

A young man from Kenya told how grants and fellowships tended to be awarded in his country, not according to intellectual and academic qualifications, but rather to the applicant's ethnic group. The preferred ethnic affiliation was the same as that of the persons in power.

An ethnically Serb cab driver in Vienna told the Petschauer's in July 1999: "You know, the Albanians are very different from us. They have so many children, as many as 20 per woman. Do you realize what that means in terms of feeding such a family? For every breakfast you have to have 22 slices of bread, for every lunch you have to have 22 bowls of soup, etc. I cannot understand why they do not find other entertainment."

Gordon A. Wood (1998) wrote:

Most historians today deny that 'the Indian' was ever in fact eliminated (from American history), but all would agree that the Indian's story has not been as well integrated into American history as it might have been (p. 41).

A young Slovenian girl recounted at the Olomouc Summer Institute in 1999 that she had been dating a Croatian boy for some time when her parents told her in no uncertain terms that she must stop seeing him. When she asked her father why, he replied: "He is completely different than we are." When the daughter persisted with her questions, he replied: "You are not old enough to know; they are just different. They have a different history."

Another young woman in the South Carolina Governor's School at the College of Charleston retold her experience in 2000 of dating a black teen. She was particularly upset because her parents and friends "gave me grief" over dating the young man. When she asked why they were against the relationship, her parents said: "Just think of all the troubles you two will have."

One of Petschauer's students at Appalachian State University recounted the following story from her visit to Estonia in December 2000. She had flown to Tallinn with her mother and a friend to bring medicine to a Children's Hospital in Jokvi. This was the third or fourth time that they had taken this trip, but it was the first time that they were stopped by customs agents at the airport and searched. Despite the fact that the Americans had obtained all the appropriate documentation from the US Government and the Estonian Embassy, the customs officials would not release the medicine to anyone other than the head of the hospital, not even to representatives from the American Embassy. The inconvenience was significant, since the hospital director was nearing the end of a pregnancy and had to rent a car to drive the two hours from the hospital to Tallinn to pick up the medicine. As it turned out, the Children's Hospital is Russian and the customs officials are Estonian.

A local North Carolina newspaper printed this story: "Charlie Lawing said that he was raised not to be a racist. He said his parents got to know and like Clara during the eight years they dated. But when it came to marriage and the prospect of children, Lawing said, his parents couldn't accept it. No matter what their intellectual beliefs, 'it was something I don't think

they were emotionally equipped to handle'" (Helms, 1999).

During the summers of 1998, 1999, and 2000, when hiking in the German-speaking part of the Italian Alps, Petschauer noticed that the Italian flag was hanging lower than the Austrian flag at one of the *Schutzhütten* (*refugios*) high up in the mountains. This was a slight to the Italians, but it went unnoticed by the untrained eyes of outsiders hiking in the area.

In the early 1990s Isaenko helped several shop owners along the main street of Vladikavkaz, Ossetia to create the appropriate Ossetian image for their storefronts. Even though some of these shopkeepers were ethnically not Ossetian, each had decided to integrate images of Ossetia's past into their fronts and displays. The pressure to do this came from the town's atmosphere and the reality that knowing Ossetian customs guaranteed ethnically Ossetian customers.

During the summer of 1998, Petschauer (who is Central European) and one of his friends (who is African American) had the occasion to walk into a bar in Charleston, South Carolina. Stares, however subtle, tell much. In this case, they seemed to reflect the backgrounds of the beholders and silent comments such as, "they must be two gay men" or "they should not really be together" or "how nice that they are having a beer together."

Still another instance of ethnic partiality took place in the subway in Munich during the same summer of 1998. An older Muslim woman, holding an infant and accompanied by her husband and (presumably) her daughter and son-in-law, entered the subway car in which the Petschauers had found a seat. The woman

and her companions were very well dressed; the grandmother was in black with an elegant scarf covering her head and expensive jewelry adorning her hands. After trying unsuccessfully for some time to soothe the bitterly crying child, she handed it to the younger woman. At that point, one of the passengers near the author slightly gestured to him with her head as if to say: "What do you expect from people like this?"

Some time during 1999, when a Petschauer family member was working in their North Carolina yard on a hot day, a woman known to the family who was passing by remarked, "You know, you shouldn't work so hard, we have colored people for that."

An African-American student from the South Carolina Governor's School told how one afternoon he stood bagging groceries behind the checkout counter at a well-known up-scale grocery chain. At some point, as he was putting groceries into bags for a young white mother with her son, who was no more than five or six, the boy said: "Look, mom, a nigger." The mother did not find it necessary either to apologize or to point out the inappropriateness of this appellation.

There is the assumption in many Eastern European countries that gypsies are dirty and that they do not take care of their living areas or property. Remarks like, "Why don't they clean up their mess?" or "We cannot trust them to live in our neighborhood because of their sloppiness," may be heard frequently.

This sort of attitude matches that in the US where some people have said, and still say, that African Americans and Puerto Ricans should not be allowed into a neigh-

borhood because they will cause property values to decline.

One incident regarding gypsies is particularly telling. A few years ago students and faculty at the South Carolina Governor's School prepared an international night. The idea was to have the international students, about fifteen of them, introduce their three or four countries to the assembled students and faculty. After the members of the Hungarian delegation spoke, they were asked about their attitudes toward gypsies. The spokesman for the group immediately launched into an explanation about the differences between Hungarians and gypsies. Among other things he described the Hungarians as typically light skinned and blond and gypsies as darker skinned and smaller in stature. He did not notice, until much laughter in the audience alerted him, that his description of gypsies fit the Hungarian sitting next to him on the podium.

During August 1998, the Petschauers were traveling from Northern Italy to Munich by train and found a seat in a compartment with three black women. One carried a passport from a West African country and the others held passports from the US. When they reached the border between Italy and Austria at the Brenner/o Pass, their compartment was the only one in the car to be searched. One might readily surmise that the Italian border guards were on the lookout for Africans, who were entering and leaving their country in great numbers. But one could also argue that they chose this compartment for no other reason than that the women were black. The border police's surprise at seeing the American passports was genuine.

One of Petschauer's students told him in the early 1990s about her being from the Fiji Islands. Although she looked similar to light-skinned African Americans, she was not happy about that association. When she left the US for Spain in the mid-1990s, she did so to escape what she perceived as massive pressure from African Americans to conform, specifically to date and hopefully to marry an African American.

During October 1998, the Petschauers traveled a few miles north of Chapel Hill, North Carolina, and stopped at a gasoline station. In search of the restroom, they noticed quickly that the only one available seemed located behind the counter and cash register. The restroom itself was well kept and clean, but both noticed with some amusement a huge kitchen knife behind the sink. What they did not notice immediately was that the manager only allowed white customers to use this bathroom. As Petschauer's wife waited for him to reemerge, an African-American woman entered the store and the attendant greeted her cheerfully as Gertrude. As the woman moved on to another part of the store, the manager said that he only lets trustworthy people behind the counter. Thus Gertrude, a woman whom he had obviously known for some time, proceeded to use the "other" facility, the one for blacks located away from the counter and the knife.

One of Petschauer's students at Appalachian State University innocently said during a discussion of ethnicity in the winter of 2001 that the US allows too many Mexicans into the country and that they are not willing to learn English. A fierce discussion ensued in which four descendents of Spanish speakers "let the young man have it," so to speak.

Part II: Ethnic policies in Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union

Next, despite the inherent pitfalls of such a task, we will endeavor to articulate the ethnically related policies of one particular dominant ethnic group, during a particular period of time. In order to elaborate the middle ground of ethnically motivated behavior, with its ultimate slide into expressions of extreme ethnic prejudice and discrimination, we chose to examine Imperial Russia during the 18th and 19th centuries, continuing into the Soviet and post-Soviet periods of the 20th century. In particular, we examined ethnically related laws because they place the attitudes of a society "on the books" and illustrate concretely the gradual changes both in popular opinion and public policy.

Here we concentrate on two issues: first, the long-standing tradition in some societies of categorizing people of different ethnic backgrounds; and second, the even older tradition of serious ethnic abuse that functions both independently of systematic categorizations and in conjunction with or as a result of them.

We start with the Russian Imperial categorization of non-Orthodox Christians as aliens (*inorodtsy*) that began in the Middle Ages in the Russian Orthodox East. During the reign of Catherine II (1762-1796) a shift in Russian colonial policy then led to the codification of the category of *inorodtsy*. This codification is of particular interest here because, as Andreas Kappeler (1994) notes, an intensification of Russian activities in Asia tended to promote a more "supple and pragmatic policy" (p. 147) toward non-Russian natives. The pressure of Russian settlers to take over lands hitherto occupied by Siberian nomads, combined with

the ideas of the Enlightenment, resulted in the emergence of a new mode of population categorization. For the first time, a person's way of life (in this case sedentary or nomadic) overtook religious considerations as "the essential criterion for differentiating" (p. 147-48) between Russians and non-Russians. Thus it introduced a mode of categorization that facilitated the Russian Imperial government's goal of harnessing the lands north of the steppe for agricultural purposes.

The first attempt at categorization may be traced to the "Proekt ustava o sibirskikh inorodtsakh" [Charter of Siberian *inorodtsy*] (1798). However the category of *inorodtsy* received legal standing only through the efforts of the Russian statesman Michail Speranski who served as governor-general of Siberia from 1819-1821. The "Ustav ob upravlenie inorodtsev" [Regulations about the Administration of Aliens] (22 July, 1822) divided "all *inorodnye* tribes (i.e., alien and non-Russian, to whom we add non-Orthodox Christian) inhabitants of Siberia," into three mutually exclusive categories of *inorodtsy*: settled, nomadic, and wandering (p. 196). But an enterprise that was made for "more effective administration" ultimately demanded more discriminating classifications (Konev, 1995, pp. 75-78) that led to what we consider here mild forms of ethnic suppression. This policy was guided by three basic principles: 1) the preservation of existing traditional native social institutions and the use of them for taxation, 2) the "partial rationalization" of administrative practices, and 3) a "differentiated approach" to governing Siberian (and later Caucasus) natives (Konev, p. 90).

Thus the settled *inorodtsy* were thought to have achieved a level of civilized development that qualified them for legal equality with the Russian population. They were considered "equal to Russians in rights and obligations according to the *sosloviia* [institutionalized societal division] to which they belong" (Ustav, 1822, Article 13). While they were exempt from conscription, they were for the most part included in the *sosloviia* of the state peasants, and only some were included in the *sosloviia* of merchants and Cossacks (Ustav, Articles 14-16, 17). Non-Russians could attain this legal status of settled *inorodtsy* only if they abrogated their traditional (ethnic) style of life. This legal status appeared to be arbitrary and in a very real sense seemed like a payment by the dominant Russian ethnic group to some of them for suppressing their way of life and occupying their lands. For administrative purposes, their ethnic identity was irrelevant.

The "Ustav" also identified two lesser categories of *inorodtsy*, assigning to them as well particular obligations and restrictions. In the "nomadic" category were such peoples as Buriats, Tungus (Evenk), Yakuts, Ostiaks (Khanty), Voguls (Mansi) and a number of territorially (but not ethnically) identified peoples of Southern Siberia. They were allotted particular grazing areas that they could change according to the seasons of the year (Ustav, Article 3). Another category, the "wandering" *inorodtsy*, included the Nenets, the Koviaks, Evenks, Evens, and the native inhabitants of Kamchatka and the Pacific coastal region of Okhotsk and Gizhiga (Ustav, Article 4). The nomadic *inorodtsy* were subject to two forms of taxation, the so-called *iasak* (basically a tax on natural products) and local taxes. The wandering

inorodtsy were subject only to the *iasak*. Both groups retained their traditional tribal leadership, but they did so for the purposes of *iasak* collection because overall they were placed under the strict control of local imperial administrators (Konev, pp. 79-93).

As imperial expansion continued after 1822, the term *inorodtsy* came to be applied to an increasing number of ethnic groups. After the decades-long struggle to conquer the Caucasus and the invasions in Central Asia and the Far East, the peoples of these areas were also assigned *inorodtsy* status. Thus, by the end of the 19th century, when imperial expansion had reached its apogee, the list of peoples placed in *inorodtsy* status comprised thirteen categories, including Caucasus mountaineers, Armenians, Georgians, and Greeks, and Jews (Conotly, 1971, pp. 55-75).³ This categorization of some people in the Russian Empire as *inorodtsy* created a legal division of the population into two judicial categories: those who were "natural subjects" and those who were *inorodtsy*, considered lesser peoples than the former, according to their style of life, religion, and language.

These later forms of ethnic restriction are illustrated vividly by the position of Jews in the Empire; but they also included a further subdivision, that replicated somewhat the earliest Siberian categorizations and led further toward the extremes of ethnic discrimination and prejudice. Tsarist scholars have acknowledged the existence of a second division between Jews and all other *inorodtsy*. Specifically, Russia's Jewish population was subjected to a large body of separate legislation (see Greenberg, 1944-51). Alexander Gradovskii (1875), one of the most famous legal scholars of the Empire, ex-

plained the official position of Russia toward the Jews as being guided by two basic principles since the reign of Catherine II (see also Orshanskii, 1877). He said, "Jews by the very existence of their religion, are opponents of Christianity and thus dangerous opponents of the ruling church.... Jews are also by the nature of their lives and occupations an unproductive and harmful element of the population who must be turned toward work that is useful to the government and society" (Gradovskii, p. 406; also Nathans, 1999).

Thus, during the later period of the Empire, ethnic differences came to be conceptualized increasingly in terms of language and religion. The term *inorodtsy* was gradually more used to designate all (linguistically and sometimes religiously different) non-Russians. But even within this unique context, Jews were considered to be an exception. All other *inorodtsy* were considered civilizationally more primitive than Russian speakers. Their paganism and Islam (such as in the Caucasus or in Central Asia where it mixed with strong vestiges of paganism and traditional norms of common laws like the *adats* in the Caucasus Mountains) were not considered insurmountable obstacles to ultimate assimilation. But Jews were thought of differently; their strict adherence to Judaism was alleged to be clearly opposed to Orthodox Christianity (Gradovskii, p. 394). Yet even Jews were encouraged to assimilate, in particular the wealthy and other successful personages. The grandfather of Vladimir Lenin and the father of Leon Trotsky are well known examples of such assimilation.

After 1897, the desire on the part of the government to assimilate *inorodtsy* became even greater. Events in the first decade of this century drew further attention to the

instability of the imperial regime and to the potential threat of the Empire's multiethnic character. Furthermore, the defeat of Russia in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05) reactivated racist fears on the part of Russians toward the Empire's huge Asian populations, as did stirrings of pan-Turkism that were exemplified by the activities of Ismail Bey Gaspriuskii (Zenkovsky, 1960). The widespread participation of the non-Russian population in the revolutionary activities of 1905-06, particularly in Poland, the Baltics, Finland, and the Caucasus, put the ruling elite on alert and was seen as a perilous sign for the future of the state (Ascher, 1988).

Moreover, data from the census of 1897 (which were not published completely until 1907) gave clear demographic evidence of the near minority status of ethnic Russians within the Empire. If one used native language (and sometimes religion) as surrogate for ethnicity, the census showed that Russians would not make up a majority of the Empire's population unless one added Belorussians and Ukrainians to their ethnic group. In full knowledge of this reality, Belorussians and Ukrainians were officially defined as members of the Russian people (the *ruskii narod*) and their languages were relegated to dialects (Conotly, 1971). The authorities compounded this ethnic rearrangement by restricting the number of schools that could use native languages as the language of instruction and increasing the use of Russian as the dominant language for education in local schools.

Hardliners and members of the official establishment advocated even more dramatic forms of ethnic rearranging pertaining to Jews and some Muslims. These approaches take us beyond the milder forms of ethnic restriction into more blatant

forms of ethnic abuse. For Jews, for example, the imperial government applied severe forms of ethnic discrimination by introducing the so-called *cherta osedlosty*. By these rules, Jews were allowed to live only within the boundaries of strictly assigned territories, which were predominantly located in the western part of the Empire. Restrictions on particular professions were also debated and put into practice. In general, religious affiliation was a considerable, but not necessarily insurmountable, impediment to the *inorodtsy* as they endeavored to enter and succeed in professional careers. However Jews not willing to convert enjoyed no flexibility, and their religious affiliation prohibited them from advancement in various professions.

The politically contentious standing of the word *inorodtsy* in the last years of the Empire is defined well in the words of the ethnographer Lev Shternberg (1910):

The term *inorodtsy* is understood in a dual sense in the language of the government and nationalistic press, a political and a technical-judicial one. In the political and most important meaning of the word, the basic indication of non-Russianness is language. Only the population who speaks the Great Russian dialect has the privilege of being called Russian people. Neither race, nor religion, nor political loyalty, play an essential role. Poles, being of Slavic blood, speaking a Slavic dialect, are nonetheless considered *inorodtsy*. Georgians, although Orthodox, nevertheless remain *inorodtsy*. Even Ukrainians, native blood brothers of the Great Russians, similarly Orthodox, but having the audacity to speak their own Little Russian dialect, are ... considered *inorodtsy*. Baltic Ger-

mans, renowned for their loyalty [to the Empire], similarly remain *inorodtsy*, just like the 'rebellious' Poles. However, Russian sectarians, even when they are the most furious enemies of Orthodoxy and ... [act] suspiciously in the eyes of the government ... but use the Russian language, remain immutably on the rolls of the *ruskii narod*.... Behind this classification is a real political reality, a whole complex of political relations of enormous importance (Shternberg, p. 531).

Despite the fact that they spoke Russian, Jews were *inorodtsy* and had specific harsher rules that applied only to them; to drive this point home further, any attempts by the government to assimilate *inorodtsy* and to incorporate them into the *ruskii narod* came predominantly in the linguistic sphere. Yet it was precisely this official policy that gave birth to a hostile response of nationalistic/ethnic movements among *inorodtsy*. In virtually every case, the emergent political struggle for independence began as an effort to preserve or to broaden the sphere of native languages, to enhance "national systems of education," and to invent or broaden the use of non-Russian alphabets. Thus, aside from religion, language and language-based culture became for *inorodtsy* the most important building block of ethnicity, self-identification, and self-preservation. In other words, this "mild" ethnic distinction and discrimination played a major role in creating nationalist movements that led eventually to violence. Thus the Russian authorities' dream that peoples who were defined as *inorodtsy* would eventually enter the category of *ruskii narod* was doomed to failure. Even when the early Bolshevik government of-

fered national (ethnic) self-determination, it became quickly evident that this approach was no more than a tactical maneuver and used only temporarily to attract non-Russian groups to the Bolshevik cause. Perfect examples of this point were Josef Stalin's and Grigorii Ordzonikidze's promises of autonomy, including religious and linguistic guarantees, to Chechens, Ingushetians and other mountaineers if they would help eradicate Terek Cossack resistance to the Bolsheviks.

After the short period of relatively mild attitude toward linguistic freedom, the Bolsheviks under the leadership of Stalin in 1928 launched a "Cultural Revolution." In fact, they returned to the practice of their imperial predecessors and reasserted the Russian language in state educational programs in native schools and simultaneously diminished the role of native languages in all spheres of social and political life. In a further blow, between 1938 and 1940, the authorities replaced earlier alphabets with the Cyrillic alphabet (except in Armenia and Georgia) and thus began to undermine the ability of non-Russian speakers and writers to succeed in the Soviet Union and to bar access to written historical sources. While this approach appears harsh, in the context of the later deportations of these peoples, it must be seen as a relatively mild ethnic repression (Isaenko and Petschauer, 1999). Nikita Khrushchev's government reactivated this relatively mild policy in the 1960s, that is after World War II, as part of an official policy of "further rapprochement of socialist nations." His policy closed all native language schools in the Russian Federation and almost all of them in the autonomous republics and districts of the Soviet Union. Following this logic, the "nationality schools" in the

autonomous republics were next on the list to be eliminated and, for example, the communist government in Georgia quickly launched an anti-Abkhazian language policy in Abkhazia (Sharia, 1993).

In view of this long-standing governmental practice, one ought not to be surprised that right after the Russian Revolution of 1917, and once again during Gorbachev's *perestroika* and *glasnost*, the political struggle of various ethnic groups for independence began with efforts to enhance the status of their native languages. They wanted "their" languages to be the main means of communication in their areas and in their schools, and they wanted to reduce the number of Russian language schools.

Events had a curious way of turning on Russians after 1991. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russians found themselves in the minority in the newly independent states. Recent developments have taken the relatively mild ethnic prejudice implicit in most of the *inorodtsy* categorizations to new extremes of ethnic discrimination. Because of the policies of the imperial and the Soviet governments, when the Soviet Union collapsed, most Russians did not, and still do not, speak so-called native languages, that is, the now official languages in the newly independent states. Thus today many face considerable restrictions in their rights. In some cases, their non-native language prevents them from receiving citizenship and cuts them off from the basic rights of that privilege. In other cases, their non-native language and their Russian ethnicity deny them access to state organs and leading positions in many spheres of political, social, and economic life. In still other cases, their Russian ethnicity has become

reason enough for them to be threatened in a variety of ways, even to the point of losing their livelihoods and being forced to flee for their very existence.

This ethnic picture of Russia during Imperial and Soviet times shows several things. 1) The diversity of the groups that were being categorized was much greater than the simple categorizations readily allowed. 2) There was a gradual awareness of the diversity of peoples and an effort to integrate the "least diverse" into the leading ethnic group. 3) There was a certain naïveté that allowed administrators over a long period of time to assume that "lesser" ethnic groups would continue to permit their depreciation. 4) Even though the approach was not overtly intended to lead to the exclusion of Jews and others from jobs and definitely not to the trains and concentration camps of the Stalinist period, the ultimate outcome was extreme ethnic abuse. Thus, what seemed to be rational categorizations (in terms of Enlightenment ideals), at least until the middle of the 19th century, became, later in that century and in the 20th, vehicles for ethnic hatred and abuse. The pogroms of the 19th century and the deportations of Chechens, Ingushetians, Kalmyks, Balkars, Karachai, Meskhetian Turks, (Baltic, Volga and Crimea) Germans, Crimean Tatars, Greeks, and Bulgarians in the middle of the 20th century are the culmination of the "enlightened" 18th-century categorizations of peoples.

Ignatieff (1998) argues in *The Warrior's Honor* that the differences between ethnic groups that fight each other often appear insignificant to outsiders. He disagrees with others who maintain that in Yugoslavia or Ossetia, for example, the religious and other differences between

groups are so great that they fight in order to determine which form of culture will succeed over the other. Ignatieff is correct in assessing the civil war in Yugoslavia, though his argument does not hold for Russia in the 19th century or Ossetia at the outset of the twenty-first. He describes an interview with a Serbian irregular who explains to him his hatred of Croats. The Serb makes several points. Most importantly, the Serb thinks that everyone in the area is the same. The differences between Croat and Serb are not great—that is indeed the point. But the small differences make for the strife. The cigarettes the Serb is smoking are Serbian and the ones the Croats are smoking are Croatian. The Croats think that they are better than Serbs; they want to be gentlemen and think they are fancy Europeans. The Serb believes this is why they smoke a different brand of cigarette; i.e., they are different in the small things that matter. The Serb thinks he is different from everyone else, an attitude that goes to the heart of the conflict, namely that most non-Serb fighters saw themselves as Europeans and saw Serbs as mere farmers. By the very nature of the conflict, the Croat may at one time have been the Serb soldier's friend and classmate, but later the differences between them became significant enough to make him into an enemy. Thus emerged an enemy picture, or *Feindbild* in the poignant German phrase.

The point that small differences do indeed become enlarged, and that neighbors do indeed become enemies, can also be made about the low-level tension that characterized many former autonomous republics of Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union during the 19th and most of the 20th centuries. Neighboring ethnic peoples were similar in some areas, such

as Russia and Ukraine, and very different in others, such as Russia and Uzbekistan. Thus some enemy images emerged because people knew each other well and lived side by side, and others emerged because people had hardly ever seen each other until modern work settings and transportation methods brought them closer. The point is that whether the groups grew to dislike and hate each other by knowing each other well or not at all, the Russian Imperial categorizations predisposed them toward attitudes and behaviors that led to the disastrous expressions of ethnic prejudice in the 20th century.

Considerations

Before discussing the continuum of ethnic differentiation as such, we offer examples of how difficult it is for contemporaries to determine changes from one descriptor of ethnic differentiation to another, say from moderate to more extreme distinctions and discriminations. The subtlety and variety of ethnically motivated behaviors are such that a single individual, or even groups of individuals, have difficulty noticing changes unless they are experienced as drastic. For example, is identifying a person's ethnic affiliation when describing him/her a slide away from ethnic normalcy and peaceful coexistence? Specifically, in the Northern Caucasus, it became customary in the mid-1990s to define oneself and others by ethnic affiliation. Thus in conversations about colleagues at North Ossetian State University in Vladikavkaz, it became common practice to mention someone's ethnic background before the subject that he or she taught. Thus a person would be described as a Russian who taught English literature. While this practice also occa-

sionally framed conversations in Soviet times, it had now become pronounced and foretold of later more dramatic behaviors. This signifier pointed to the beginning of perceiving Russians as outsiders and reflected a growing pressure for them to leave Ossetia.

Similarly, in the former Yugoslavia and particularly in today's Bosnia-Herzegovina, it has become customary to define oneself and others as part of a specific ethnic group: Serb, Croat, or Muslim. (Although the last of these appellations sounds like a religious definition, in reality it indicates that the person is of Turkish descent.) Does this frame of reference mean that people there will descend once more into conflict? Or are the warring parties "sick of war"?

In South Tyrol in Northern Italy, people also define themselves as being either German or Italian speaking, meaning that they are principally of German (Austrian) or Italian descent. For reasons having to do most likely with economic stability and the successful practice of autonomy, these appellations are losing some of their implicit *Feindbild* meanings. As indicated, in the US, ethnic affiliation is often carried visibly by skin color, hair color, clothes, or even language. The defining moment comes when consciousness of ethnicity, through language or symbols such as skin color, becomes more pervasive than other considerations, such as gender, sexual preference, or regional origin. And while many white Americans have difficulty to this day saying anything positive about an African American without also offering his or her ethnic affiliation, some white Americans have begun to give that designator less weight.⁴

At the more radical end of the range, ethnic discrimination can become state policy, as it did in late Imperial Russia toward Jews, in National Socialist Germany toward Jews and gypsies, in Apartheid South Africa toward blacks, or in the pre-civil rights US toward American Indians and African Americans. Whether state-sponsored or carried out individually, such extreme expressions tend to be precursors of actions such as murder, torture, and rape. The major or controlling ethnic groups—for example, Europeans in the US, the Dutch and English in South Africa, and the Russians in Imperial Russia—not only determine the popular attitudes toward so-called minority groups, but also provide the legal frame of reference for state ethnic policy. Even if laws encourage humane conduct of all peoples in a certain society, the attitudes of the dominant group, whether a minority or a genuine majority, determine the common conduct, and even affect some local laws, educational opportunities, and corporate behavior.

Indeed, the reality of a group's ethnic identity—its characteristics, boundaries, and historical components—is complex and subject to change, interpretation, and reinterpretation both by members of the group and by outsiders.

In the accompanying chart, we have chosen to define the areas of difference between members of ethnic groups and the treatment they give and receive in a series of overarching categories. They are: body/space practices, the use and abuse of language, religious expressions, sharing histories, ethnic affiliations, state organizations, and economic perspectives. They serve as the core building blocks of ethnic behavior and are in turn moderated into utopian, normal, and extreme forms of

differentiation by members of dominant or non-dominant ethnic groups. We have shown how the Russian Imperial and Soviet governments were aware of the second and fourth of these building blocks (language and history) and how the Soviet government was additionally aware of the third (religion). For example, by undermining local alphabets and enhancing the Cyrillic alphabet, Soviet authorities restricted the access of local language users to the benefits of Soviet society and to their historical documents. The repercussions for those who lost access to their native language were significant: they had to speak a new language and learn a new interpretation of their own past. (Conquest, 1978, p. 37).

Imitating their Imperial and Soviet predecessor governments, the newly independent states have begun within less than a decade to use language, history, and religion to discriminate against Russians and other non-natives in their states. As a consequence, there is now a vast exodus from practically all newly independent states of those who are not members of the new dominant ethnic groups, be they Russians, Georgians, Ossetes, Cossacks, or Poles. Chechnya, with its openly hostile policy toward Russians, became the most visible case when Russia took revenge for the treatment of its ethnics there (see Arbiev, 1998). Ossetia is practicing the same sort of ethnic expulsion and extremism with much less obvious policies. These forms of extremism are in both cases similar to those being practiced and experienced in Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The slide into ethnic violence may indeed originate in three areas: ethnic/national identification, economic deterioration and interests, and unscrupulous leadership. In the cases of Imperial Russia, the Soviet

Union, and some of the states that emerged since the collapse of the Soviet Union, we draw the following conclusion. *Ethnic identification*, created and emphasized through state policy, *economic threats*, intensified by devastating declines both in Russia proper and in outlying areas, and *unscrupulous leadership*, magnified by the aggressive pursuit of selfish goals, contributed immediately and significantly to the slide into extreme expressions of ethnic discrimination, prejudice, and hatred.

Long-standing ethnic policies and related perceptions heighten sensitivity to boundaries of ethnic groups and enhance group cohesion in dominant and non-dominant groups. This identification may readily take on explosive characteristics when an intense economic decline threatens the very existence of all social groups in a society and makes members of one group pull together and turn against another, competing neighbor group. When leaders, eager to succeed in turbulent circumstances, trigger the defensive, rallying tendencies that intensify group members' allegiance to their own group and promote enemy images of another group, tensions can and often do become extreme. As we have shown, one can identify the middle ground of ethnic differentiation and the tendencies that lead from it to extreme ethnic behavior. Indeed, the middle ground of ethnic expression, especially if shored up by policies, can readily lead to disaster, given the "right" economic and leadership circumstances.

Finding the Middle Ground: IMAGINING THE IDEAL

Body/space practices ⁶	Use/abuse of language	Religious expression	Sharing histories	State organizations	Economics
Acceptance of different ethnic foods	Language is not a barrier to any level of education	Practice, by tradition and choice, of any religion	All ethnic groups are included in accounts of history	Ability and encouragement of all ethnic groups to participate freely in government	Maintenance of relatively high economic development that is open to all ethnic groups in society
Ability to bury the dead in each ethnic group's chosen burial grounds	Freedom to choose educational options	No one religion enjoys support of state laws and agencies at the expense of others	Unrestricted opportunities to maintain and access monuments of historical, cultural, and religious significance	Ability of international and national organizations to recognize a traditionally established new state	All ethnic groups have access to economic activity, that is, are able to open businesses and to be in corporate settings
Acceptance of a variety of aesthetic norms	Tolerance of different cultural activities in all media outlets	Ability for each religion to practice its beliefs	Use in private and public by all groups of traditional symbols and accoutrements	Support by state organs of, and respect for, all ethnically significant monuments	Local and international corporations are able to operate without restrictions
Each ethnic group can plan and build its own settlements—architecture and interiors	Use of a/several principal languages, none officially receiving priority	Free and unrestricted opportunity of all religions, hierarchies, charitable institutions, etc.	Acceptance of ethnic-specific calendars		
No restrictions on choice of living locations	Unrestricted use of print material in minority language groups	Ecumenical interaction and cooperation	Acceptance of so-called "non-traditional" or folk medicine and ethnically-originated healers		
Freedom to wear different styles of clothing and ethnic designs as part of a regular routine or ceremony ⁷	Equality of all representative languages in the constitutional structure	"... emphasize [our] common humanity..." ⁸			

Finding the Middle Ground: "NORMAL" LEVELS OF ETHNIC DISCRIMINATION

Body/space practices	Use/abuse of language	Religious expression	Sharing histories	State organizations	Economics
Use of ethnic styles to affirm and assert one's ethnic background	Some denial of access to government positions because of language	Tendency of some ethnic groups to prefer a particular form of religious expression	Creation, in its early stages, of the image of "the enemy"	Preference given to the leading ethnic group for governmental positions	Spread of corruption through nepotism and hoarding of positions and honors by dominant group
Sense that the dominant ethnic group should have greater access to valued space in society ⁹	Promotion of the dominant ethnic group's language in a state or a subdivision of that state	Some effort by some religious groups to assert the preeminence of their religious affiliation	Creation of an official nationalistic history that looks for a defense of a glorious past	Replacement of local and regional territorial officials by ethnically reliable leaders of the leading ethnic group	Some preference given to hiring of ethnic majority
Use of specific ethnic clothing as a way of affirming one's ethnic affiliation	Denial of access to prominent social positions because of language	Some hostility of some religious groups against the non-predominant religious group	Creation of a society's history that does not include the experience of all ethnic groups	Limited practice of individual and small group humiliation, harassment, assault, battery, robbery, and kidnapping	Rejuvenation of clan and kinship ties and patterns
Viewing the dominant group's male and female body as the expression of aesthetic fulfillment	Constitution forbids those who do not speak the dominant language to hold elected or appointed offices		Support and promotion of the cultural inheritance of the dominant ethnic group		First firing of non-majority ethnics
Search for an ethnically pure style of housing	Educational facilities sometimes do not provide opportunities for minority to learn the majority language		Spread among "ordinary persons" of so-called "domestic nationalism"	Seating of certain ethnically affiliated students in specific areas	Invention and spread of humiliating jokes and anecdotes
				State law requires equal but separate schools ¹⁰	

Finding the Middle Ground: EXTREME EXPRESSIONS OF ETHNIC DISCRIMINATION

Body/space practices	Use/abuse of language	Religious expression	Sharing histories	State organizations	Economics
Idealization of dominant ethnic group males, their bodies and attitudes, with consequent devaluation of minority males	Linguistic chauvinism Neglect, hindrance, prohibition, or oppression of non-dominant languages	Prohibition against visiting minority places of worship Inability of minority religions to operate their own organizations and councils	Glorification of the history of the leading ethnic group Falsification by leading intellectuals of the history of the dominant ethnic group	Organized mass murder and extermination of "alien" populations; ethnic cleansing Organized or encouraged actions aimed at destroying ethnic minorities by creating unbearable living conditions	Imposition of restrictive measures on representatives of "unwanted" groups Official and non-official measures excluding minorities from certain professions
Mass minority relocations accompanied by ethnically charged statements, policies, and activities	Discussion by the dominant ethnic group of restricting themselves to one language	Disapproval and prohibition of marriages between dominant and minority group members	Forced enrollment of students in certain types of educational establishments	Suppression and elimination of groups in pogroms, dislocations, and concentration camps	Unequal and unfair taxation of ethnic minorities
Claims that so-called "primordial" ethnic territories should either be retained or returned	Glorification of the dominant ethnic group and projection of their negative components onto the supposed enemy	Radicalization—pre-pogrom-like—of dominant religious teachings such as sermons and publications	Falsification of minority histories	State-sponsored conditions of everyday life that encourage ethnic group members to leave their traditional homeland	Protection of fellow ethnics from the official laws of their society
Calls for territorial adjustments or re-alignments of borders by the public or state	Organized and state-sponsored defamation of a particular ethnic group and its leaders	Ascription by the dominant religion of malignant, evil characteristics to minority religions	No mention of non-dominant ethnic groups in dominant group's history	Ethnic minority denied access to key political, economic, and social resources by ethnically-controlled state organs	Confiscation of properties of non-dominant ethnics and their redistribution to dominant ethnics
Assertion of the dominant group's rights by changing place names that carry traces of the "alien" presence	Organized campaigns to boycott particular ethnic groups and their adherents	Inability of minority religions to create their own charitable institutions		Open persecution of minority leaders, sometimes called dissidents	
Restrictions on living locations for minorities					

Finding the Middle Ground: CONDITIONS THAT CREATE THE IDEAL

Basic expectations ¹¹	Educational initiatives	Religious normalcy	Overcoming old traumas	International and economic efforts	Issues of government
Sports and other cultural activities are open to all ethnic groups	Educational systems are open to all ethnic groups in the community	Most religious expressions, except for the highly extreme, are not hampered	Accurate histories are written of different ethnic groups in a society	International and regional tourism flourishes with access to all areas	Government is limited and laws are universal
Freedom of speech is clearly protected by educational institutions	Individuals feel free to step forward to make this integration possible and to keep it alive	Internal political, religious, and ethnic disputes are resolved peacefully	"Folk" diplomacy is fostered	International and regional human rights organizations operate without restraint	Minority ethnic groups participate freely in government at all levels
Right of all ethnics to the integrity of their bodies and cultural expressions	Grants and fellowships are open to all members of the community	Ethnic groups participate in the political, economic, social, and religious institutions of society	"Truth Commissions" are in place	Maintenance of relatively high economic development which is open to all groups in society	Ethnic groups in the society have reasonable access to the resources of the state
Freedom of movement is guarded	Specific programs to train leaders for the society	Religious institutions publicly decry ethnically violent behavior	Reconciliation efforts are in place	International courts operate freely in the society	No manifestations of radical ethnic or national discrimination are tolerated on a local and national level
All minority groups are included in the educational process	International educational organizations operate freely and educate students locally and abroad	International and regional religious councils operate freely and encourage communication between groups	International and regional experts operate to reduce ethnically charged expressions	Interethnic economic activity is supported and receives protections	Condemnation and judicial procedures are available
				International corporations operate freely	Establishment of minority political, social, and educational bodies is not inhibited

Notes

1. As a sampling, see Honig and Both, 1997; Jones, 1998; Stanzel, 1997; Strozier and Flynn, 1966; Staub, 1992; and Sudetic, 1999. While not specifically dealing with the present topic, as background it is useful to read Anderson, 1991; Nicholson, 1999; Smith, 1986; Volkan, 1997; and Weston, 1997.
2. An extreme example of this kind of ethnic confrontation was the 1999 decision of the town of Usti Nad Labem in the Czech Republic to build a wall down the middle of the town's main street to separate gypsies and non-gypsies (see *The Charlotte Observer*, 1999, October 17, p. 27A.).
3. Interestingly from the perspective of the present argument about language being one of the determinants of ethnicity, Georgians and Greeks who were Orthodox Christians but not Russian speakers, were considered *inorodtsy*. The full list of peoples officially recognized as *inorodtsy* included: 1) Siberian *inorodtsy*, 2) Chukchi, 3) Dziungors or Altai, 4) inhabitants of the Commander Islands, 5) Samoeds or Nenets of Arkhangelsk guberniia, 6) nomads of Stavroposl guberniia, 7) Kalmyks of Stavropol and Astrakhan guberniias, 8) Kyrgyz of the Internal Horde, 9) nomads of the Akmolinsk, Semipalatinsk, Semirechie, Urals, and Turgai oblasts, 10) natives of Turkestan, 11) Ordynsy, 12) Caucasus mountaineers (Cherkess, Adygeans, Kabardians, Tatars, Dagastani, Chechens, Ingushi, Ossetes), 13) Jews. Later people from the Volga region and Ukraine were added to this listing (see Conotly, 1971, pp. 55-75).
4. But as one single example shows, one need not only deal with color; unfortunately ethnicity seems to penetrate deeper (see McConnoughey, 1999).

5. Chart may not be cited without the authors' permission.
6. Nieto, 1992, pp. 14-18.
7. See *The Charlotte Observer* (1999a). Cherokees rebury university specimens. October 1, p. 3C.
8. Blum, 1998, p. 29.
9. Estrin, 1999, p. 9A.
10. See Abdullah, 1999, p. 21A.
11. See Weston, 1997, pp. 29-31.

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